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Introduction  
Some views of justice mainly the social contract model of Thomas Hobbes, and the 
fairness model of Rawls may have failed to challenge and overcome the peculiar 
ideological and value-laden character of an African environment, thus creating the 
impetus for reconsideration. The social contract model of justice assumed that there 
would be justice when people acting as rational agents accepted basic practices of 
society that would assure their mutual advantage in the long run. The impartiality 
or fairness model of justice, suggests the recognition of the intrinsic worth of 
people as entities deserving of respect, whose interests should be maintained in the 
interest of the overall common good. How do these theories apply to the African 
condition? These issues will be the thrust of this paper as we argue that the two 
models are not enough in solving the multifarious problems that Africa finds 
herself. These will be examined succinctly in arguing for the latent solution 
towards a sustainable social order that considers and puts everyone and the society 
towards attaining justice and development. 
The idea of Hobbes was based on the conception of justice as mutual advantage. 
This theory holds that the function of justice is to construct social devices that 
enable people who are essentially egoists to get along better with one another 
(Nielsen, 1996:86-87). Thus within the egoistic framework of life, the reason for 
justice is the pursuit of individual advantage.  In other words, given that limited 
resources and conflicting interests characterised human life then people can expect 
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to further or promote their interests, if they live harmoniously with others in the 
society (Nielsen, 1996:86-87).  Therefore, justice emerges here, as “a set of 
minimal constraints necessary for achieving social coexistence, co-operation and 
well being” (Nielsen, 1996:86-87).  This conception of life concedes that there is a 
need for justice understood among others as the basis of productive human 
cooperation. 
Besides, Rawls engages the utilitarian position by further pointing out its grievous 
defects. In responding to classical utilitarianism, he brings up the idea of justice as 
fairness, based on a contractarian conception of reality. According to him, “each 
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society 
as a whole cannot over-ride. For this reason, justice denies that the loss of freedom 
for some is made right by a greater good shared by others” (Rawls 1972:3-4). He 
argues further that “when the principle of utility is satisfied, however, there is no 
assurance that everyone benefits” (Rawls 1972:177). What then are Rawls 
principles of justice, and what do they signify?  
Hobbesian Justice and its Short-falls: Rethinking the Unending State of 
Nature as Anarchy or Servitude  
Within this western Modernist account, we can appreciate a theoretician of justice 
such as Thomas Hobbes, who insisted on the concept of justice within the ambits 
of the idea of the Leviathan. The Leviathan retains immense and illimitable powers 
over men and materials and is thus capable of guaranteeing justice. Hobbes made it 
clear that the conception of justice and security offered by the Leviathan became 
imperative due to the low life expectancy, ominous danger and insecurity of life 
and possessions in the state of nature. Central to the imperative of justice in 
Hobbes is the appreciation of the circumstances real and imagined prevailing in the 
state of nature. Hobbes traces the emergence of the Leviathan to the nature of man 
and the conditions of the state of nature. He says that nature has made men equal in 
the faculties of the body and mind. Despite that there are differences in the way 
men are endowed with these faculties; these differences are not so considerable as 
to allow one man certain qualities that others do not have. For him, this equality of 
ability among men gives rise to the equality of hope or the belief that all have the 
same chances of attaining their ends. This equality gives rise to disputes over the 
resources of nature, in which people exercise their powers in order to conquer, 
dispossess or deprive weaker ones of their lives, liberties and properties. Therefore, 
Hobbes contends that the equality of men gives rise to a condition of mutual 
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destruction in which no man can be sure of emerging victorious or subsisting for a 
reasonable length of time (Hobbes 1963:142).  
According to Hobbes, that period of human existence when men live without a 
common power to control them all or arbitrate among them is called “the state of 
war” (Hobbes 1963:143). In this state, every man is against every man. Hobbes 
takes care to point out that this state of war encompasses not just conditions of 
actual conflict, but also the state of existence in which men are disposed to behave 
as if they are in a state of war. Furthermore, in the state of nature or war where 
every man is every man’s enemy and the security and protection of life and 
property is not assured, there is no industry or fruitful labour. And other human 
activities like culture, art and society do not exist. For Hobbes, the state of nature is 
the state of war. It is the state of the violence and anarchy of every one against the 
other. This condition of life is typified by the inability to guarantee survival and 
peace for any reasonable length of time. One of the most distinctive features of the 
state of nature is the fact that it does not guarantee the individual or aggregate of 
interests except there is a normative exit using the facilities of a contract. Hobbes 
informs us that it is absolutely important to note that “to this war of every man 
against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions 
of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no 
common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice” (Hobbes 1968:188). 
The outright repercussion of this is that “in such a condition, every man has a right 
to every thing; and therefore, as long as this naturall right of every man to every 
thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he 
be)” (Hobbes 1991:110).  
But this is not all about the state of nature. Hobbes informs us that “worst of all, 
there is a continual fear and danger of violent death. In short, the life of man is 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1963:143). Against the 
background of the absence of a common power, law, notions of justice and 
injustice, right and wrong in the state of nature, Hobbes says that the passions and 
the reason of man lead him to search for peace. Man’s quest for peace arises from 
his fear of death, and his desire for those resources necessary for adequate living. 
By desiring peace and co-operation, man uses reason to fashion some convenient 
articles of peace out of the right and law of nature. According to Hobbes, the right 
of nature is the liberty that all men have to use their powers to preserve their lives, 
while the law of nature is a general rule derived from reason, which forbids a man 
to destroy his life or the means of preserving his life. For Hobbes, the first and 
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basic law of nature is to seek peace, while the second law of nature enjoins a man 
to readily give up his right to self-defence if others show a willingness to do 
likewise.  
He notes that a man gives up his right to self-preservation either by renouncing or 
transferring it. A right is renounced when one does not care to whom the benefit 
goes, while a right is transferred when one intends that the benefit goes to some 
specified persons. Hobbes maintains that the acts of rights’ renunciation or transfer 
are conducted through declarations and transactions binding the participants to a 
term of agreement. The goal of rights’ transfer is the guarantee of security of life 
and the means of preserving life. In effect, the realisation of the short-falls of the 
state of nature would pave the way for the emergence of the commonwealth. 
According to Hobbes, social order as the great Leviathan, commonwealth, state is 
an artificial man created to protect and defend the natural man. He says that “the 
sovereignty of the Leviathan is its artificial soul, which gives life and animation to 
the whole body” (Hobbes 1963:139).  In his view, the Leviathan’s strength lies in 
the wealth and riches of all its members. And every part or member of the 
Leviathan is induced to perform his duties by the sovereign who has the power to 
punish or reward. 
For Hobbes, contract is the name given to the mutual transfer of rights among men. 
It is the basis of the commonwealth, which exists in order to ensure that lives are 
preserved and made happy. The protection of life and property is guaranteed in the 
commonwealth, only when men erect a common power on which they confer all 
their powers and strengths. Hobbes notes that “this common power can be one man 
or an assembly of men” (Hobbes 1963:148). The commonwealth is attained 
through the processes of the transfer and renunciation of the rights of man and the 
laws of nature. The commonwealth emerges from the debris of the state of nature 
that was defeated by the superior logic and opportunistic inclination of men. The 
commonwealth, according to Hobbes, is the only source of security both from 
human nature, natural forces and other material creations of men. The 
commonwealth is the aggregation of an institutional arrangement of a multitude 
that has covenanted through the social contract to form and live in the society in 
order to assure themselves of mutual defence, peace, progress and protection from 
internal and external dangers. The power of the sovereign, conceived as either the 
ruler or the society, is central to attaining justice and security.  
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Rawls’ Notion of Justice and its Weaknesses:  Ideological Neutrality as 
Ambivalence or Formalism   
Rawls justified his position using a broadly Kantian contractarian view-point. 
According to Rawls, “the principles of justice are also categorical imperatives in 
Kant’s sense. For by a categorical imperative, Kant understands a principle of 
conduct that applies to a person in virtue of his nature as a free and equal rational 
being (Rawls, 1972:253). Rawls tries to provide what he considers to be a model of 
social order based on a conceptualisation of justice. His ideas tilt towards the 
redistribution of wealth and opportunities typical of social democratic theorising. 
For Rawls, the identity and conflict of interest that illustrate life in any society 
marked by social co-operation, collaboration and distribution, necessitate the 
existence of a set of principles. He says that these principles are to guide our choice 
among the various social arrangements, which determines the division of 
advantages and for under-writing an agreement on the proper distributive shares. 
Thus, Rawls goes ahead to defend his two principles of justice on the ground that 
“the public recognition of the two principles gives greater support to men’s self 
respect and this in turn increases the effectiveness of social cooperation. Another 
way of putting this is to say that the principles of justice manifest in the basic 
structure of society men’s desire to treat one another not as means but only as ends 
in themselves” (Rawls 1972:178-179).  
For Rawls, in a contemporary account, “justice is a set of principles required for 
choosing among the various social arrangements, which determine the division of 
advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares. 
These principles are the principles of social justice, they provide a way of assigning 
rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation” (Rawls 1971:4). 
Rawls insists that a society is well ordered only when it is designed to advance the 
good of its members and also effectively regulate its operation by a public 
conception of justice. He holds that “the primary subject of justice is the basic 
structure of society or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages 
from social co-operation” (Rawls 1971:7). Moreover, the justice of a social scheme 
depends mainly on the principles of justice, which free and rational persons 
concerned to advance or promote their personal interests would accept in an initial 
position of equality. 
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Rawls says that the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature 
in the traditional theory of the social contract. Understood as a purely hypothetical 
situation, Rawls argues that the original position is essentially about the fact that 
“no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does 
anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence, strength, etc.” (Rawls, 1971:13). Rawls assumes also that the parties 
in the original position do not even known their conceptions of the good or their 
special psychological attitudes and inclinations. Rawls’ idea of justice as fairness 
emphasises on the procedures by which rights and duties can be determined and 
allocated in ways that ensure fair distribution of advantages and benefits (Solomon 
and Greene 1999:426&435). To this effect, Rawls highlights the idea that the 
human being’s starting point in life is a matter of chance. Hence, Rawls places all 
choices behind the veil of ignorance, which aims at ensuring that no one is 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice, due to circumstances or chance. Hence, 
the veil of ignorance describes the operations of the original position in which 
individuals do not retain any prior knowledge or advantage that can unduly affect 
their choice of the principles of justice. To the extent that the principles of justice 
are chosen behind a veil of ignorance, the intention of Rawls is to guarantee that no 
one is disadvantaged or advantaged in the choice of principles, either by the 
outcome of natural chance, or the contingency of social circumstances. 
According to Rawls, persons in the initial situation would choose two principles. 
“The first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties. While the 
second holds that social and economic inequalities for example, those of wealth 
and opportunity are just, only if, they result in compensating benefits for everyone 
and in particular for the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 1971:14). In 
other words, Rawls proposes two principles of justice: “Firstly, each person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Secondly, social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity”(Buchanan, 1980:9). Thus, Rawls 
proposes the greatest equal liberty principle, the difference principle and the fair 
equality of opportunity principle. Rawls first principle covers basic liberties for 
instance, the freedom and right to vote, freedom of speech, and of the press, 
freedom of the persons. His second principle requires that the basic structure be 
arranged such that any inequalities in prospects of obtaining the primary goods 
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(wealth, income, power) must work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
in the society. His principle of fair equality of opportunity demands a movement 
beyond formal equality of opportunity to ensuring that those with similar skills, 
abilities and motivation, enjoy equal opportunities (Buchanan, 1980:9-12).  
A Critique of These Views vis-a-vis Dominant African Cultural Forms of Life 
The apparent failure of erstwhile classical philosophies of justice for African 
development and social order to counteract discriminative moral and political 
conduct elicit a dilemmatic situation. A traditional Western conceptualisation 
(DeMarco and Richmond, 1977:86) of the philosophy of justice is centred on an 
analysis of the social contract model of Thomas Hobbes and the fairness model of 
John Rawls. These models among others have failed to challenge and overcome the 
peculiar African crises of justice and development. These traditional western 
philosophies have not succeeded in Africa due to obstructive traditional templates 
that have re-institutionalised regressive authoritarianism, tenuous hegemony, 
anachronism deriving from both the primordial and colonial forms of ethno-
religious prejudices, conflicts, mistrust and mutual xenophobia among groups. In 
traditional African cosmology, justice and human relations principles are a key 
component of culture. The idea of justice practised by the Africans is to be seen in 
their age-long activities that depended on robust sense of social or ethnic identity. 
This kind of justice was often kinship in nature operating on internal familial 
principles of intense human homogenous co-existence. In a sense, the African 
cosmological justice was one that operated in a community of people bonded by 
kinship and familial ties, and thus could not operate on the impersonal and 
impartial laws. Due to the smallness and knit character of the traditional African 
communities, kinship justice connoted a concern for attending to the actual 
interests of every member, such that the good was seen as the well being of the 
entire society and not of the majority nor of an individual. The ontological bonding 
typical of justice in a knit community did not allow for any demonstration of the 
trappings and chaos typical of the state of nature. It is clear that the core western 
conceptions of the justice idea may not have easily fitted into the African 
cosmological models. The concrete reality of the western ideas shows a 
commitment to values that may not easily work in the African spaces. Social 
interest imperatives underlie the foundations of justice and effectively make the 
discourse on justice a cultural or context bound event.  
The social contract model of justice assumed that there would be justice when 
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people acting as rational agents accepted basic practices of society that would 
assure their mutual advantage in the long run. This has not really worked in 
African development practice, due to the nullifying effects of kleptocracy, 
patrimonialism, cult of personality in power relations, institutional decay, 
antinomies and apathy, precipitation of primordial ethno-cultural enclaves. 
Defining the impartiality or respect model of justice, which suggests the 
recognition of the intrinsic worth of people as entities deserving of respect, whose 
interests should be maintained equitably in the interest of the overall common 
good, have also failed due to the realities of cultural, historical and psychological 
inducements to truncate or restrictively appropriate the principles and institutions 
intended for the common good; federalism, industrialisation and social services.  
The appealing, systematic and well-articulated justice theory of Hobbes suffered 
from certain internal contradictions. It did not fully account for the dangers arising 
from the illimitable powers that were bestowed on the sovereign as ruler. Hobbes 
did not reckon with the fact that these powers would pave the way for dictatorship, 
primitive accumulation, misappropriation, authoritarianism and the eventual denial 
of the same justice and security of lives and property. It was this unresolved 
paradox of justice and security that other theoreticians tried to address. Hobbesian 
idea of justice fails in so far as the individualistic rational egoism that led to the 
emergence of the state or society has created a state that now unleashes the very 
injustice or non-justice situation that the state was supposed to arrest or modify. 
What this means, is that the application of Hobbes theory of justice to Africa may 
not work not only due to the nullifying injustices perpetrated by the state, but also 
due to the fact it refuses to recognise the communalist non-individualist ontology 
or basis of the African societies. In modern Africa, the Hobbesian model of justice 
refuses to foster the definitive distinction between the state of nature and the state 
itself. The core visions and values of the state in Africa, is to persecute, terrorise 
and subjugate the mass of Africans. The real tragedy of an inclusive communalism 
grafted on a modern individualist perception of reality occasions a crisis of identity 
and national planning that turns virtually every institution or structure into a vector 
of injustice. The real failure of state machineries such as the police, military, 
census and education can be tied to the irreconcilable contradictions arising from 
the desire to communalise and ethnicise individualistic mechanisms designed for 
social order and change. The communal factor, therefore, becomes the currency 
that nullifies the play of individualism as a directing principle.    
It should not be forgotten that Rawls theory is individualistic though it recognises 
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the least advantaged (Manicas, 1981:279). This is the character of a liberal theory 
of justice that stands in contradistinction to that of Africa to the extent that it is 
based on “the vision of society as made up of independent autonomous units who 
co-operate to further the end of each of the parties; which vision Rawls presses to 
its logical limit by deriving the principles of justice themselves from a notional 
social contract” (Flew, 1976:75). Let us not forget that “contractarian theories are 
undermined when it is shown that they favour a particular model of society” 
(Eshete, 1975:40). This view of justice is in the first instance, restrictive both from 
an African exogenous view-point and from a parallel western view-point of 
Marxian theorising. Engels and Marx apparently concur on the “total 
condemnation of justice-talk as mere ideology, and consequently, justice seems 
never to mean anything more than “justice within a particular socio-economic 
system.” There was feudal justice and there is bourgeoisie justice” (McBride, 
1975:205). Under such arrangement, Husami (1978:33) insists that “the distributive 
arrangements of a society can be evaluated by means of a standard different from 
the prevailing (or ruling) standard of justice.” 
Human Nature and Ethnicity as Principles of Social Control in Africa 
In looking at the mechanism of social control that both embodies and underlies 
ethnicity we cannot but examine what ethnic groups are, what are those things that 
make ethnic groups distinct? What are the manifestations of ethnicity and how do 
these become consequential for human social and political existence whether 
positively or negatively? The popular conception of ethnicity is that which 
highlights its prominent negative aspects. Odugbemi (2001) makes it clear that 
“ethnicity undermines the fundamental values without which we cannot build a 
sane, serious, democratic society” (2001:70). Galey holds that the processes of 
culture that define ethnicity may also influence citizenship attitudes to development 
and integration in a national context (1974:270). These cultural processes and 
influences are, therefore, essentially cognitive and transmittable. Ethnicity becomes 
potent because living styles, values and behaviour are cognitively acquired and 
transmitted to new generations through social institutions such as family and tribe. 
These may encourage resistance and/or openness to change (Galey, 1974:270), 
which either relates to the self or even others.  
There are a number of values and visions that ethnicity transmits, which make it a 
force that is self-animating and equally countermanding to dominant modernising 
instruments such as the state, etc. Ethnicity transmits specific views of economic 
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relations, loyalty, identity, etc. Clapham holds that ethnicity is a very effective 
basis for mobilising political support and family and kinship ties provide more 
reliable means of achieving loyalty than the state and its bureaucracy (1991:98). 
This situation obviously has profound consequences for establishing and sustaining 
community and consensus. Goulbourne notes that the mobilisation around ethnic 
credentials as seen in the operations of minorities or majorities, depends 
significantly on the political and economic circumstances that define inter-group 
relations. Thus the mobilisation of ethnicity entails the mobilisation of bias 
(1997:166). Also Lemarchand says that the over-whelming aim of ethnicity is its 
focus on exclusion of others from power. The ensuing contexts and struggles for 
control have decisive negative impacts on patron-client relationships, inter ethnic 
identities (1974:143). Such convolutions in social organisation and psychological 
pre-dispositions simply replace the question of human survival on the centre stage. 
Ethnicity compels us to place the issue of human well-being and survival on the 
front burner then we have to understand the motivations and compulsions of human 
nature.  
Human nature is a critical aspect of human existence. Berry (1986:xiii) insists that 
“social and political organisation has to accommodate itself to the human nature 
and not vice versa.” In other words, human nature is a primal symbol in the quest 
for understanding ethnicity. This is a conceptual issue having far reaching 
empirical consequences. Dewey makes the vital point that the nearly immutable 
innate needs of human beings define human nature that:  
I do not think it can be shown that the innate needs of 
men have changed since man became man or that 
there is any evidence that they will change as long as 
man is on the earth. Needs for food and drink and for 
moving about, need for bringing one’s power to bear 
upon surrounding conditions, the need for some sort 
of aesthetic expression and satisfaction, are so much 
part of our being. Pugnacity and fear are native 
elements of human nature. But so are pity and 
sympathy (1974:116-118).  
The foundational character of human nature is to be apprehended and connected to 
what Mill refers to as the natural sentiment of justice, which is defined by the 
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interplay of the purportedly innate ideas of punishment, self-defence and sympathy. 
Mill states that: 
two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice 
are, the desire to punish a person who has done harm, 
and the knowledge or belief that there is some 
definite individual or individuals to whom harm has 
been done. The desire to punish …is a spontaneous 
outgrowth from two sentiments, both in the highest 
degree natural, and which either are or resemble 
instincts; the impulse of self-defense, and the feeling 
of sympathy. A human being is capable of 
apprehending a community of interest between 
himself and the human society of which he forms a 
part such that any conduct, which threatens the 
security of the society generally, is threatening to his 
own and calls forth his instinct of self-defense 
(1962:306-307).  
Human nature and its significance for survival and progress make further sense 
only in the context of the social nature of man. According to Mackenzie (1963:35), 
“human association, societies are first formed for the sake of life; though it is for 
the sake of good life that they are subsequently maintained. The care of the young, 
the preservation of food and drink, the provision of adequate shelter and protection 
would suffice to account for the existence of human societies.” This implies that 
society is necessary for some level of comfort and hope for the human being. 
We also know from history that human associations have been the core sources of 
security problems. For example, there is the problem of tyranny and man’s 
inhumanity to man, as seen in the internal operations of human actions in a society. 
There is the wider social insecurity generated by human inter-cultural conflicts 
among human associations. All of these problems can be predicated upon the 
personal and social manifestations of human nature and human actions. The clearly 
psychological, cultural and economic motivations of human nature are further 
highlighted in the problems of human finitude and limitations, seen as our ethical 
and metaphysical imperfections. We also confront the restrictive limitations of our 
peculiar human natures as individual men. And all of these taken together pose a 
stumbling block to our search for perfect human relations. Given the reality of 
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conflicts and prejudices, Brown (1989:3) says that ethnic conflicts can be explained 
using the natural tendency towards ethnocentrism: people seem to trust and prefer 
those of their own cultural group, while being distant and distrusting of others. 
The increasing tendency of ethnic people to think fundamentally in terms of the 
ethnic group (Said and Simmons, 1975:65) leads to the real threat of mutual 
annihilation or the massive repression of the less-privileged and competitors. We 
can understand the full import of things, when we read and see that ethnicity has 
led to state-sponsored slaughter, the oppression and murder (Riggs, 1994:584); 
unparalleled cultural diversity heralding constant conflict and bloodshed 
(Campbell, 1992:58) and sentiments motivating people to acts of extreme violence 
against the other (Turton, 1997:3). For Turton (1997:11), ethnicity has a strong 
mobilising power to acquire greater leverage and competitive advantage. Thus 
ethnicity often gives rise to ethnic conflicts in which people decide to employ their 
ethnic differences in pursuing competing interests (Osaghae, 1994:9). The end 
result of all of this according to Rosel is that ethnic conflicts have become 
politicised and radicalised thus assuming a self-sustaining character, which 
threatens the legitimacy and integrity of multi-ethnic states. Through the 
politicisation and militarisation of ethnic conflict, groups acquire the self-
awareness and organisation, cohesion and bitterness and finally, intransigence and 
cynicism, which make a peaceful and enduring resolution or settlement difficult to 
negotiate (1997:146&153). 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued in this paper that the real tragedy of an inclusive communalism 
grafted on a modern individualist perception of reality occasions a crisis of identity 
and national planning that turns virtually every institution or structure into a vector 
of injustice in Africa. And the main reason why these models - Hobbes and Rawls 
among others - have failed to challenge and overcome the peculiar African crises 
of justice and development. These traditional western philosophies have not 
succeeded in Africa due to obstructive traditional templates that have re-
institutionalised regressive authoritarianism, tenuous hegemony, anachronism 
deriving from both the primordial and colonial forms of ethno-religious prejudices, 
conflicts, mistrust and mutual xenophobia among groups. The Hobbesian model of 
justice refuses to foster the definitive distinction between the state of nature and the 
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state itself while Rawls’ argument also projects the individual even though there is 
the tendency towards the least-off in the society. 
Our argument in the quest for social order is that of looking at the discourse of 
ethnicity and human nature as the approaches towards social control, resuscitation 
and reconstruction.  This situation obviously has profound consequences for 
establishing and sustaining community and consensus and it is a critical aspect of 
human existence as it is a significant part towards survival and progress, which 
makes sense only in the context of the social nature of man 
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Order in Africa: A Philosophical Reflection 
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Divergent opinions and theories have been propounded towards attaining social order in 
human society as most of those theories are believed to have significant positive effects on 
the restructuring and reconstruction of society. This is done in the struggle for society 
devoid of manipulations, deceit, injustice, inequality among other problems confronting 
man in his relation to others around him. It should be pointed out from the outset that 
Thomas Hobbes’ theory on the Leviathan and that of John Rawls’ argument for justice as 
fairness are seen as significant in the reconstruction of the society and stand out among 
other models/theories. Hence, the essence of this paper is using the platform of these two 
theorists to argue for the reconstruction of justice and development in African society. This 
shall be dealt with to in putting across the pit-falls and the inadequacies of the theories to 
Africa predicaments. 
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